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Abstract: It is usually accepted that whether or not indirect discrimination is a
form of immoral discrimination, it appears to be structurally different from direct
discrimination. First, it seems that either one involves the agent focusing on
different things while making a decision. Second, it seems that the victim’s
group membership is relevant to the outcomes of either sort of action in different
ways. In virtue of these two facts, it is usually concluded that indirect discrimina-
tion is structurally different from direct discrimination. I argue against the notion
that indirect discrimination and direct discrimination have significantly different
structures. I first argue that both kinds of discrimination involve similar decision-
making processes. Second, I analyze how being in a social group affects personal
identity, and from there argue that indirect discrimination and direct discrimina-
tion are about group membership similarly. In virtue of these two arguments,
I conclude that direct and indirect discrimination are structurally similar.
Keywords: social groups, disparate impact, disparate treatment, immoral
discrimination
1 Introduction
It is typically thought that immorally discriminating against someone involves
treating them disadvantageously because of their sex, race, religion, etc. (e.g. their
group membership), while treating someone else of another sex, race, religion,
etc. well in comparison. One form of immoral discrimination involves intention-
ally disadvantaging someone because they belong to some social group; call this
disparate treatment. Another form of immoral discrimination involves accidentally
yet substantially disadvantaging, or tending to disadvantage, some social group
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according to a group-neutral criterion specifying certain behaviors or vernaculars,
particular kinds of work experience, or reading abilities, to name a few; call this
disparate impact.1 There is some debate regarding disparate impact’s status as a
form of immoral discrimination. Authors such as Richard Arneson, Sophia
Moreau, and Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen have argued that disparate impact can
be a form of immoral discrimination.2 On the other hand, there are authors who
dispute its status as a form of discrimination or question its political usefulness:
Matthew Cavanagh, Iris Marion Young, and Michael Selmi, to name a few.3
However, both sides agree that disparate treatment and disparate impact are
significantly different from one another. For instance, a disparate treatment dis-
criminator intentionally treats certain individuals differently just because of their
group membership. On the other hand, a disparate impact discriminator only
treats certain individuals differently because of non-group traits they have, and
not at all because of their group membership. These seem like fairly important
differences, hence why disparate treatment and disparate impact are regarded as
substantially different from one another.
Although I think disparate impact can be a form of immoral discrimination,
I believe that the standard analysis of its relationship with disparate treatment
has fallen short in two ways: significant similarities between them have gone
unnoticed, and group identity as a social phenomenon has been given too
limited a role in understanding either action. For instance, although it is com-
monly said that disparate treatment discriminators are primarily motivated by
the victim’s group membership, this is not the full story. Oftentimes it is not just
the victim’s group membership they care about: they are also consciously
motivated by some significant, non-group trait that is believed to be inextricably
1 It should be noted that not every accidental group disparity is caused by disparate impact
policies. Disparate impact only occurs in cases where some illegitimate, group-neutral criterion
can be identified as the cause of the relevant disparities. For instance, suppose that medical
schools will not accept any applicants who studied at a junior college, and suppose that most
junior college students belong to minority groups. Suppose further that the administrators of
medical schools believe that students who attend universities immediately after college are
generally smarter than those who don’t. However, this supposition is false, and the criteria is
subsequently illegitimate. Even though the criteria does not specify any minority groups, there
will obviously be significant disparities. This is an instance of disparate impact since the criteria
are actually irrelevant to the legitimate aims of the relevant organization, even though the
criterion in question does not address any particular social group.
For a discussion of this scenario, see “The Community College Pathway to Medical School: A
Road Less Traveled” (Kellerman and Saguil, 2014).
2 See Arneson (2013); Moreau (2010) Lippert-Rasmussen (2006, 2014). See Altman (2011) for an
overview of arguments both against and in favor of disparate impact qua concept.
3 See Cavanagh (2002); Young (1990) Selmi (2013).
2 R. Cook
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 8/26/15 4:47 AM
associated with the group (e.g. Muslims are violent, homosexuals are immoral,
Jews are greedy). If that’s the case, then disparate treatment discriminators
intentionally treat someone differently because of some non-group trait, much
like disparate impact discriminators. In this paper, I argue that disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact are structurally similar to one another, and present a
definition of discrimination that captures their structural similarities while con-
serving our basic intuitions about what cases count as discrimination.
In Section II, I provide an overview and analysis of what others have said
about the differences between disparate treatment and disparate impact. It is
said that they differ regarding how the discriminator deliberates about her
actions. It is also said that they are about group membership differently. In
virtue of these two facts, they are thought to be dissimilar at a fundamental level
to a significant degree, and are therefore significantly different actions (i.e.
structurally dissimilar). In Section III, I’ll analyze two different cases of discri-
mination in order to conclude that disparate treatment and disparate impact
actually have similar deliberative processes.4 In Section IV, I’ll analyze the
relationship between one’s group membership and possessing certain socially
significant traits. This analysis allows us to conclude that disparate treatment
and disparate impact are about group membership in similar ways. Therefore,
contrary to the current discourse, Sections III and IV allow us to conclude that
disparate treatment and disparate impact are structurally similar. To clarify their
structural similarities, I provide a definition of disparate treatment and disparate
impact in Section V based on the information provided in Sections III and IV. In
Section VI, I show that understanding disparate treatment and disparate impact
as being structurally similar is compatible with our basic intuitions about what
is and is not discriminatory. In Section VII, I summarize my argument and reflect
on the disparate treatment/disparate impact distinction.
2 The current discourse
There are two elements which compose the structure of either disparate treat-
ment or disparate impact. First, there is their deliberative process, or how the
discriminating agent makes her decisions (i.e. what factors she takes into
4 Restricting myself to only two cases was an entirely pragmatic decision, but it’s under-
standable if one suspects that I am guilty of a hasty generalization regarding the role of neutral
traits in disparate treatment. In order to ensure that my inferences are at least somewhat
justified, see the following references for further examples of group-oriented disparate treat-
ment and prejudice where the discriminator also cares about neutral traits: Roediger and Esch
(2012, 29–39); Roediger (1991, 21, 57–59); Von Vacano (2012, 12).
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account). Second, there is how they are about group membership. To say that
discrimination is about group membership means the victim’s group identity is
relevant to the fact that the resulting disparities are group-oriented; the fact that
the person is part of some group helps explain why she was disadvantaged. In
this section, I give a broad overview and analysis of how Kasper Lippert-
Rasmussen, Sophia Moreau, and Andrew Altman have characterized these ele-
ments in the context of disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Let’s start with the deliberative differences between disparate treatment and
disparate impact. The most obvious way to characterize the deliberations of a
disparate treatment discriminator is to say that she uses the victim’s group
membership as a reason to engage in disparaging treatment of the victim.
Rasmussen makes this idea a necessary condition for disparate treatment:
such discrimination can only happen if the agent treats someone disadvanta-
geously because they supposedly belong to some socially salient group.5
Andrew Altman also captures this notion in a very straightforward manner:
“Without the intent to disadvantage persons based on their [group membership],
there is no [disparate treatment]”.6 Sophia Moreau captures the notion of what it
means to treat someone differently “based on their group membership” with her
example of a discriminating landlord. This imaginary landlord refuses “to lease
an apartment to someone because he is of a particular culture”.7 As she points
out, “because of” refers to the fact that the victim’s belonging to a particular
culture is the discriminator’s reason for refusing to lease him a room.8 In each
case, we can see that disparate treatment is thought to involve targeting some
person for differential treatment just in virtue of their group membership, and
that this fact is distinctive of disparate treatment.
Disparate impact is distinguishable from disparate treatment because the
discriminators are not concerned with the victim’s group membership. As
Atlman explains, the primary difference between disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact is that the latter sort of discriminators “do not aim to disadvan-
tage persons for being members of a certain group”.9 Alternatively, Rasmussen
states that disparate impact is characterized by the fact that the discriminator
does not bear any bias against the relevant social group.10 Another way of
putting the issue is to state that a disparate impact discriminator cares about
5 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014, 45).
6 Altman (2011, 5).
7 Moreau (2010, 158).
8 ibid.
9 Altman (2011, 6).
10 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014, 61).
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the victim’s non-group/neutral traits.11 Moreau provides an example that illus-
trates this point well. Suppose there’s a public pool, and the individuals who run
the pool have restricted access to only those who live in the immediate neigh-
borhood. The residents of the immediate neighborhood are well-off white peo-
ple, and the people beyond the neighborhood tend to be poorer black people.12
Although we cannot say that the black people were excluded just in virtue of
their race, we can say that they were excluded “because of [their] possession
of some extraneous [i.e. irrelevant] trait” (viz. where they lived).13 Thus, in
contrast to disparate treatment, we can say that disparate impact involves
targeting someone for differential treatment on the basis of some irrelevant,
non-group trait that they possess.
So much for the deliberative differences between disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Now we can move on to discussing how they are said to be
about group membership. Each of the authors mentioned above would agree
that disparate treatment is about the victim’s group membership because the
discriminator purposefully targeted the relevant group. As for disparate impact,
one might say that the victim’s group membership is thought to be indirectly
relevant to the disparities. Moreau seems to suggest something like this in the
context of her public pool scenario. The fact that the black people lived in poorer
neighborhoods can be explained by the lack of quality “education and oppor-
tunities, which [would] only partially [be] the result of other people’s assump-
tions about these individuals’ race”.14 Altman suggests something similar when
discussing the Griggs vs. Duke Power court case. The fact that the victims were
black, combined with the poor state of education for black people in North
Carolina at the time, explains why Duke Power’s black employees were consis-
tently disadvantaged by the company’s promotional practices.15 Said otherwise,
the victims’ “identity as blacks was a key factor” in explaining their disparities.16
The idea seems to be that the victim’s group membership is relevant to the
resultant disparities in disparate impact, insofar as pre-existing social conditions
typically cause members of the victim’s group to possess the neutral traits
11 For the purposes of discussing the current discourse, a non-group trait is some neutral trait
that an agent possesses (e.g. vernacular, skills, work experience); it is any trait that is not the
property of being a member of some group. By contrast, a group trait is simply the trait of
belonging to some group (e.g. being black, being Muslim, being a woman); it is the property of
being the member of some group.
12 Moreau (2010, 159).
13 Moreau (2010, 151).
14 Moreau (2010, 159).
15 Altman (2011, 9).
16 Altman (2011, 9).
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specified by the disparaging policy. In other words, group disparities obtain just
because certain social conditions surrounding the relevant group cause the
victims to possess certain traits.
The current discourse leads to three conclusions. First, disparate treatment
and disparate impact have different deliberative processes: the former is con-
cerned with the victim’s group membership and the latter is concerned with the
victim’s non-group traits. Second, disparate treatment and disparate impact are
about group membership differently. In disparate treatment, the victim’s group
membership is relevant to the outcomes because of the discriminator’s inten-
tions. In disparate impact, the victim’s group membership is relevant to the
outcomes because of certain social conditions surrounding the victim’s group. In
virtue of these two facts, and because their deliberative processes and relation-
ships with group membership constitute their structures as actions, the current
discourse leads to the conclusion that disparate treatment and disparate impact
are structurally dissimilar (i.e. fundamentally different to a significant degree).
3 Overlooked similarities
One might be convinced that the current discourse adequately characterizes
disparate treatment and disparate impact as being structurally dissimilar.
However, there are good reasons to doubt that conclusion. In order to demon-
strate that disparate treatment and disparate impact are structurally similar, let’s
start by analyzing two instances of discrimination. Consider a popular case of
disparate treatment: Dred Scott vs. Sandford.17 The basic details of the case are
as follows: Dred Scott was a slave owned by John Emerson. Scott filed a lawsuit
to obtain his freedom, both in the state courts and in the federal courts, but was
unsuccessful. The federal courts concluded that Dred Scott had to remain a slave
because he was a “negro.” However, Justice Robert Taney also explicitly men-
tioned that black people were considered to be morally inferior to white people,
and therefore had no rights or freedoms to cling to.18
Before analyzing Dred Scott’s case, let’s consider an instance of disparate
impact: Nuala Crilly vs. Ballymagroarty Hazelbank Community Partnership.19 In
Northern Ireland, Nuala Crilly attempted to gain employment at the previously
17 1857, United States of America; https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/60/393.
18 For a discussion of the case, see (Mills 1997, 25).
19 “Nuala Crilly v Ballymagroarty Hazelbank Community Partnership.” October 2011. Equality
Commission for Northern Ireland.
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named partnership. As part of their employment requirements, applicants had to
have 2 years’ paid experience in community development within the last five
years. The partnership justified this requirement on the grounds that their
employees had to “perform with minimal supervision; and do the job without
the need for extensive training.”20 Nuala Crilly, due to her childcare responsi-
bilities, took six years off from paid work. However, she had a consistent
voluntary role in the relevant field during that time period. Regardless, the
partnership rejected her application. The judges noted that 90.6% of women
were more likely to take time off for childcare duties than men were, thus
putting them at a serious disadvantage.21 The court ruled that her volunteer
experience would be sufficient for employment, and that she could have been
sufficiently trained during the partnership’s two month induction period.
Summarizing the first case by saying “Scott was intentionally mistreated
because of his group membership” would fail to capture all the details of the
judges’ reasoning. Scott was not mistreated simply because he was a “negro”.
Rather, it’s because “negroes” were considered morally inferior that he and
others were mistreated. We could even say that it’s because of their group
membership that they were considered to be morally inferior, or that being
morally inferior was a trait considered to have been intrinsic to “negroes”.
Furthermore, it doesn’t seem like the judges would treat Scott in the way they
did unless they had those beliefs. It would be inappropriate, in other words, to
say that the judges were only motivated by Scott’s group membership. Rather,
they were motivated to engage in intentional mistreatment by a significant trait
that they believed to be inextricably associated with Scott’s social group; that is,
both elements factored into their reasoning.
Something similar happens in Crilly’s case: she was treated unfairly on the
basis of a trait that she possessed due to her group membership (e.g. woman,
mother). Obviously, the hiring managers were motivated by a trait that they
perceived to be significant relative to the goals of their company. Immediately, it
seems like we have found something common between disparate treatment and
disparate impact: the discriminators are motivated by a trait that is (supposedly)
particularly associated with the victim’s group identity and is thought to be
significant either in itself or relative to some goal.22 If that’s the case, it’s false to
20 ibid.
21 ibid.
22 One might worry that I am making a hasty generalization regarding the relevance of non-
group traits when it comes to disparate treatment. I will cover one potential counter-example
later in the paper. For the time being, for further examples of disparate treatment where the
agent explicitly cares about the victim’s non-group traits, see the following resources: Roediger
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claim that disparate treatment discriminators are only motivated by the victim’s
group membership.23 Rather, the discriminators are also motivated by what are
perceived to be the victim’s relevant traits, much like in disparate impact.
If either sort of discriminator is concerned with significant traits that are, in
some sense, markedly associated with particular groups, then either kind of
discrimination involves a similar deliberative process. We can break down their
deliberative processes thusly: The agent (a) acts according to some plan or
policy that indicates some particular individual, set of individuals, or anon-
ymous individuals for differential treatment; and (b) she acts differentially
toward the relevant person(s) because they (i) belong to some social group
and/or (ii) (supposedly) possess some significant non-group property.24 As
and Esch (2012, 29–39); Roediger (1991, 21, 57–59); Von Vacano (2012, 12). Additionally,
psychological literature on the issue of prejudice seems to indicate that one’s prejudices are
created or motivated by the agent’s beliefs about what kinds of traits are possessed by the
subjects of their ire (Kunda and Thagard, 1996; Yamauchi, 2005 Rutland, Killen, and Abrams,
2010). Insofar as prejudices are relevant to disparate treatment, we can say that discrimination
is motivated by one’s beliefs about the traits that the victim possesses.
23 One could grant that my analysis of disparate treatment is factually accurate yet object that
the supposed supervenient relationship between Scott’s group membership and his supposed
moral inferiority justifies explaining the disadvantages purely in terms of his group member-
ship. Thus, one might say, the above conclusion is false. However, I don’t think the super-
venient relationship automatically justifies that mode of explanation. As David Roediger
explains, it was believed that “negroes’” supposed moral inferiority entailed a weak moral
constitution, and as such they could not be trusted with the duties and privileges of citizenship
lest they cause the eventual dissolution of society (1991, 57, 59). This helps makes sense of why
the judges denied Scott citizenship; we would not get the same clarification by merely stating
that it was because of his race. Said otherwise, the fact that the judges believed “negroes” were
inherently morally inferior better explains why they disadvantaged Scott in a particular way
than by simply saying “they did X because Scott belonged to Group N”. Since saying “they did X
because Scott belonged to Group N” does not sufficiently explain their particular actions, we
ought to reject that model and accept the one proposed above.
24 My goal is not to provide a deliberative process that is distinctively “discriminatory”, as I
doubt that such a thing is possible: Arguably, many other kinds of differential treatment involve
a similar structure. Nevertheless, it is usually said that disparate treatment and disparate impact
are distinguishable due in part to their deliberative differences. As such, the point of laying out
a deliberative process wherein disparate treatment and disparate impact are similar is to show
that they are not as distinct from one another as is normally thought.
Additionally, I am not trying to claim that the intentions of either discriminator are morally
similar to one another. That is, I am not trying to provide an account of discriminatory
intentions that automatically lends itself to talking about discrimination in a moral sense.
Since I’m not concerned with what makes discrimination wrong, I can set aside the issue of
whether or not disparate impact discriminators and disparate treatment discriminators have
morally similar intentions.
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established in the preceding paragraph, the disparate treatment discriminator
obviously has some social group in mind along with some non-group property
(i.e. (i) and (ii)). Meanwhile, in disparate impact, the discriminator has some
individual with some particular traits in mind (i.e. (ii)). Even if the disparate
impact discriminator does not put a name to the traits (i.e. the parties are
anonymous), she obviously knows that she is dealing with people who possess
particular traits. Thus, even when the discriminator addresses anonymous indi-
viduals, she is committed to addressing individuals with particular traits in a
loose sense (i.e. (ii)). Having said this, it seems that either sort of discriminating
agent is concerned with some non-group trait that the targeted person pos-
sesses. In other words, contrary to what others have claimed, it seems that
either sort of discrimination involves a similar, albeit non-identical, decision-
making process.
What I have said is not completely at odds with what other philosophers
have posited. For instance, Rasmussen suggests that what we really mean when
we say that disparate impact doesn’t involve intentional decisions is that the
discriminator and/or the policy doesn’t reflect any bias “against members of
[some group]” just in virtue of their being in that group.25 I agree with the
no-bias condition, and there’s no reason to suppose that it contradicts the
above analysis. A bias, roughly speaking, is a subjective tendency towards
treating some particular person or group favorably or unfavorably, whether
the person does so intentionally or not. This can be combined with the notion
that disparate treatment involves the deliberative process identified above. We’d
merely say that a disparate treatment discriminator has a subjective tendency to
treat some particular group unfavorably because of some trait they supposedly
possess, or that the policy reflects such a bias. Furthermore, saying that dis-
parate impact discriminators focus on particular traits does not mean that they
are biased in the relevant sense. Even if they are biased against the neutral
traits, it’s still the case that they are not biased against the person qua group
member. Hence, my way of understanding the deliberative process of disparate
impact and disparate treatment is compatible with Rasmussen’s no-bias
condition.
The above account is also compatible with the fact that disparate treatment
and disparate impact policies do not always directly specify non-group traits,
such as in cases involving policies that require employees to wear special uni-
forms while not making any further specifications.26 In the context of disparate
impact, the idea is that such policies might be disadvantageous to certain
25 Lippert-Rasmussen (2014, 61).
26 Moreau (2010, 154).
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religious groups that require their members to constantly wear special adorn-
ment. In the case of disparate impact, the discriminator in question would have
to make observations about what traits the victims possess, and make inferences
regarding their compatibility with the requirements. In the case of disparate
treatment, even if beliefs about the victim’s traits or character are not explicitly
formed, the discriminator’s attitudes would imply or entail her having such
beliefs. Alternatively, even if the discriminator doesn’t hold such beliefs herself –
e.g. someone fires an employee due to having racist clientele – it’s still the case
that she would be aware of the beliefs that people have. In other words, even if
the policy is created or enforced on behalf of someone else, the person who is
enacting the policy would have to at least consider why the person desiring the
policy is prejudiced against the relevant group. Hence, even if a given policy
doesn’t make explicit reference to some particular trait, it’s still the case that the
person employing the policy or the person responsible for it holds certain
(implicit) beliefs about what sort of characteristics the victims have qua group
members. Thus, policies like the “special uniform rule” or reluctantly enacted
policies do not contravene the deliberative process laid out above.
This section allows us to conclude that both disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact involve treating someone differently on the basis of a trait that is
either actually or supposedly possessed by the victim in virtue of their group
membership. Subsequently, both have similar deliberative processes. However,
we cannot yet conclude that disparate treatment and disparate impact are
structurally similar. Supposedly, disparate treatment is still about group mem-
bership insofar as the discriminator includes the victim’s group membership in
her deliberations. However, if we analyze how one’s group membership bears
upon their identity, we might get a different story.
4 “Being” in a social group
The particular account of group identity I present is inspired by Iris Marion
Young’s analysis of said subject in Justice and the Politics of Difference.27 The
account of group identity that follows is meant to help us see that disparate
treatment and disparate impact are similarly about group membership
Social groups can be identified along the lines of two kinds of traits:
profound traits and/or superficial traits. Profound traits are those that have
27 Young, Iris Marion. Justice and the Politics of Difference. New York: Princeton University Press,
1990.
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some bearing on the individual’s comportment, ways of thinking and reasoning,
etc. Superficial traits generally do not bear on the individual’s way of being, but
are rather those traits associated with the general appearance of the relevant
group’s members. Profound traits include customs, beliefs, worldviews, and
shared experiences. Superficial traits are easily accessible to others: skin color,
eye shape, height, and hairstyle.28 These traits are identifiers if and only if they
are qualifiers for membership in Group N. For a trait to be a qualifier means that
having that trait is a necessary condition for being part of a social group.
Similarly, having a trait as an identifier means that the trait is necessary for
identifying someone’s group membership. However, simply having a relevant
qualifying trait is not sufficient for being in a group. The individual must have
all or a sufficient number of the relevant qualifying traits, some of which may be
more important than others, in order to be considered a member of the group.
Traits become qualifiers and identifiers through the members’ interactions
with each other, other social groups, shared experiences, etc.29 The group
members share in the experiences, or are brought up on stories, and these
give rise to certain shared beliefs, norms, and interpretations of certain super-
ficial traits.30 Since the shared history of the group and the common experiences
of its members determine which profound and superficial traits identify the
group, it follows that the necessary trait sets will vary depending upon historical
and social circumstances (i.e. they are contingent). Regardless of the contin-
gency of the traits, their possession remains a necessary condition for group
membership in that particular historical and social context. In other words,
one’s possessing the historically relevant yet necessary traits constitutes their
belonging to a particular social group. If someone has all or a sufficient number
of the relevant traits, then we can say two things. First, all the traits together
jointly constitute the person’s group membership. Second, all the traits indivi-
dually help constitute the person’s group membership.
For the sake of simplicity, we could say that we’ve identified one primary
kind of trait that is relevant to group identity: constitutive traits, with profound
and superficial traits included under that general category. However, we can
specify another category of traits that are directly relevant to one’s group
28 Some clarifications: First, the traits mentioned above do not exhaust the properties that fall
under either trait category. Second, where complex traits such as mannerisms and individual
modes of comportment would fall, I am not sure. For now, I’ll say that they straddle the middle
ground between profound and superficial. Third, the line that separates superficial traits from
profound traits may become blurred when superficial traits are imbued with certain meanings
by outsiders or members.
29 Young (1990, 43, 44)
30 This list is non-exhaustive.
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membership, although they do not play a constitutive role: derivative traits.
Derivative traits are those traits that tend to obtain for a particular group
because of pre-existing constitutive traits, the person’s group membership itself,
some social circumstance relevant to the social group, or some combination
thereof.31 One can accept that such traits do in fact obtain in virtue of the
following argument.32 First, it is self-evident that one’s personal history, experi-
ences, and culture profoundly shape their identity. Second and subsequently, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the shared history of the group, common
experiences of its members, and the relevant constitutive traits give the indivi-
duals involved a shared identity: they identify with the group in a fundamental
way.33 Said otherwise, one’s group identity influences their sense of self or
personal identity, which is the individual’s way of understanding and interact-
ing with the world, herself, and others.34 This helps explain why certain traits
will tend to obtain, in a derivative sense, for the various members of a given
social group. Insofar as group identity is shared, it will influence each member’s
sense of self in similar, though not necessarily identical, ways. It is self evident
31 There could be another category of traits relevant to group membership: circumstantial
traits. These are traits that are consistently, factually associated with a group due to external
social circumstances that consistently obtain for the group in question, yet are neither consti-
tutive nor derivative of the person’s group membership. However, I am not convinced that this
category is worth endorsing. First, in order for the traits to obtain for the group consistently,
there would have to be an intimate relationship between the group and the relevant social
circumstance. This might suggest that the circumstance is either derivative or constitutive for
the group in question. Second, assuming that there are circumstantial traits, in the event that a
trait should obtain due partially to the victim’s group membership or some derivative trait and
partially to some social circumstance, it’s not clear how the resulting trait should be classified.
These concerns cannot be fully addressed in this paper, so for now I remain neutral on the
issue. Regardless, I realize the importance of social circumstances relative to some of the traits
that obtain for social groups, so I include them under the definition of derivative traits.
32 I take it to be self-evident that certain traits can consistently obtain for a group in virtue of
social circumstances. The argument that follows is simply an argument for the notion that
certain traits can obtain in virtue of a person’s group membership.
33 ibid.
34 Iris Marion Young puts it thusly: “Groups…constitute individuals. A person’s particular
sense of history, affinity, and separateness, even the person’s mode of reasoning, evaluating,
and expressing feeling, are constituted partly by her or his group affinities” (1990, 45). Similar
to Young, it should be noted that I do not think group identity totally influences individual
identity (ibid.). Additionally, perhaps in contrast to Young, I do not think that the person needs
to be conscious of her particular group membership in order to be influenced by it. For instance,
one does not need to be conscious of their nationality or cultural upbringing in order to be
influenced by that sort of thing. Nevertheless, their identity is influenced in a fundamental way
by those things, even if they are not fully conscious of it.
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that one’s identity or sense of self mediates their interactions with the world
and how they respond to events. Subsequently, one’s identity mediates which
traits will obtain for that person, at least to some degree, aside from the ones
that they already have. Insofar as group members will have fairly similar self-
understandings, certain traits will tend to obtain, in a derivative sense, for a
particular group due in part to how the members of said group understand
themselves qua group members. In other words, it’s in virtue of the relationship
between one’s group identity and personal identity that certain derivative traits
will tend to obtain for particular social groups.
We can see this in action in Nuala Crilly’s case. Nuala Crilly undoubtedly
took into account the fact that she was a mother when she decided to take time
off for the sake of her children. As a result of her decision, she lacked the
relevant kind of experience within the timeframe required by the community
partnership. Here, the derivative trait is the particular kind and amount of work
experience Nuala Crilly had, and it obtained in virtue of her decisions qua
mother. Since the trait obtained because of how she took her own group
membership into account while acting, we can say that her particular kind of
work experience obtained in virtue of her group membership.
For ease of reference, the above information can be summarized thusly:
Group membership is a complex of commonly shared, constitutive traits and experiences
from whence further traits can be derived, and either of which informs individual identity
and comportment; certain traits and experiences constitute one’s group membership,
whereas other traits are derivatives thereof; as an identity-informing complex, group
identity cannot be understood independently the relevant constitutive traits; when deriva-
tive traits obtain from one’s group membership, they must be understood as being relevant
to one’s group membership.35
Having laid out this account of the relationship between one’s group mem-
bership and personal identity, I can explain how disparate treatment and dis-
parate impact are similarly about group membership. When disparate treatment
occurs, the discriminating agent treats the victim differently because she believes,
35 Given each component of the definition, it should be clear that group membership is not
being viewed as some property which S2 possesses. This is not to say that certain traits (beliefs,
customs, etc) cannot influence identity, as my account clearly acknowledges that this is the
case. Nor is this to say that there is no such thing as a complex trait. For instance, I would say
that “work experience” is a complex trait – i.e. how many years of work experience you’ve had,
where you’ve worked, your duties, etc. However, because I am defining group membership as
an identity, it seems inappropriate to label it as a trait.
For examples that bear out the first element of this account, see the following works:
(Caruthers et al., 2004 DiFulvio, 2011, 1615; Frenn and Polfuss, 2011, 691; Rucker III, Cash 1991).
Discrimination Revised 13
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 8/26/15 4:47 AM
or the persons responsible for the policy believe, the victim has some significant
trait that is associated with the relevant group. Since the discriminator, or the
person(s) responsible for the discriminatory policy, believes that the relevant
traits are inextricably linked with the victim’s group membership, she implicitly
believes that every member of the relevant group has those traits qua group
member. The above account provides at least two plausible explanations for what
it means for someone to have particular traits qua group member. Either the
person has a trait qua group member because it constitutes her being in that
group, or it is derivative relative to her group membership. Subsequently, a
disparate treatment discriminator, or the person(s) responsible for such policies,
is concerned with traits that she at least implicitly believes to be constitutive or
derivative relative to the victim’s group membership.36 For instance, if an
employer refuses to hire a female applicant because she plans to become a
mother, we can say that she is discriminated against because of a trait that
constitutes motherhood (viz. “having a child”) or a trait that is derivable from
her being a woman (viz. “becoming pregnant”).
Under the standard discourse, part of how disparate treatment is about
group membership has to do with the discriminator’s intentions. Accepting
that premise allows us to say the following: Since a disparate treatment dis-
criminator makes her decisions on the basis of traits that are supposedly con-
stitutive of or derivable from the victim’s group identity, this must factor into
how we understand disparate treatment to be about group membership. Such
traits factor into our explanation about the relevance of group membership
because under the account presented above, group membership cannot be
understood apart from the relevant traits. Therefore, under the account I have
presented, we would say that disparate treatment is about group membership
insofar as the discriminator is concerned with significant traits that are either
constitutive or derivative relative to the victim’s group membership.
As for disparate impact, it occurs when the discriminator targets some
supposedly neutral trait that is factually associated with the victim’s group
membership. With this account of social groups in view, the targeted traits
could be those that are constitutive or derivative relative to the victim’s group
membership, similar to disparate treatment. Supposing that the targeted traits
are constitutive or derivative fits well with the facts of disparate impact and
sufficiently explains why the disadvantages obtain. To see this, let’s return to
Moreau’s public pool scenario. Some of the relevant traits that the excluded
36 Obviously the discriminator does not discriminate on the basis of those traits just because
they constitute or derive from the victim’s group membership. Rather, it is because she believes
them to be significant in some way.
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black people had were “living in a particular neighborhood”, “being poor”,
“lacking quality education and opportunities”, and “having faced a history of
oppression”. It seems fairly safe to say that “having faced a history of oppres-
sion” is something that constitutes their being part of the modern day racial
group, relative to the society they find themselves in.37 The other traits men-
tioned above can be thought of as derivative: their history of oppression led to a
lack of opportunities, which led to their poverty, which led to their living in a
particular neighborhood. Therefore, we can say that their residence derived from
some trait that constituted their group membership. Subsequently, when
explaining how this scenario is about group membership, we would say this:
their group membership was relevant because some trait constituting their
group identity led to their possessing the trait used to exclude them.38
In more general terms, we would say that disparate impact is about group
membership insofar as the discriminator targets traits that are either constitutive
or derivative relative to the victim’s group membership. Obviously, the disparate
impact discriminator doesn’t necessarily think of the relevant traits as being
constitutive or derivative. Regardless, it wouldn’t make sense to say that the
disparate impact discriminator doesn’t treat the victim differently on the basis of
those sorts of traits: the traits just are constitutive or derivative. However, the
discriminator does think of the traits as being important or significant.
Subsequently, we can say that disparate impact is about group membership
insofar as the discriminating agent targets traits that are both (believed to be)
significant and just are constitutive or derivative relative to the victim’s group
membership.
In addition to the similar deliberative processes of disparate treatment and
disparate impact laid out in Section III, we can now say that they are about
group membership similarly:39 either discriminator is concerned with a trait that
37 For a discussion of this notion, see Sally Haslanger’s (2000) “Gender and Race: (What) Are
They? (What) Do We Want Them To Be?” particularly pages 43–45.
38 I take it to be obvious that this explanation is applicable to other cases of disparate impact.
For instance, my truncated analysis of Nuala Crilly’s case on page 13 can be modified to be
similar to my analysis of Moreau’s example. Due to logistical considerations, however, I must
refrain from providing further analyses. I don’t believe my readers will have much trouble doing
this on their own, however.
39 One might wonder if there are other accounts of group membership that would lead to
similar conclusions. In short, there probably are such accounts. I am not as concerned with
arguing for a “true” account of group membership, so much as I am concerned with pointing
out that how we understand what it means for one to be in a social group affects how
discrimination is “about” group membership. This is not to say that I don’t think my account
is accurate. Rather, this is to say that its veracity is tertiary to the goal of showing that what it
means to be a member of a group is relevant to how discrimination is about group membership.
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is both believed to be significant in some way and is (believed to be) a consti-
tutive or derivative trait for some social group. Said otherwise, group member-
ship is relevant to either sort of discrimination insofar as the discriminator is
concerned with traits that are (supposedly) inextricably linked with the victim’s
group membership. Subsequently, we can conclude that disparate treatment and
disparate impact are structurally similar (i.e. fundamentally similar to a signifi-
cant degree). I will now provide a definition of disparate treatment and disparate
impact that captures the full scope of their structural similarities.
5 Criterion for disparate treatment and
disparate impact
Before presenting my criterion, there are some crucial notes that must be made.
This criterion is meant to capture the structural similarities that exist between
disparate treatment and disparate impact; it is not meant to point out the
elements that make a particular instance of either immoral. Although this
criterion does not provide the exact conditions for discrimination’s immorality
(e.g. disrespect, harm, loss of freedom), it can be assumed that meeting this
criterion is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for immoral discrimina-
tion.40 My criterion includes the elements most commonly identified as being
morally relevant to discrimination’s wrongness (e.g. group disparities, the
actor’s intentions, the justifiability of the policies). If one of these elements
must be present for immorality to obtain, and these elements are present in
my criterion, we can assume that my criterion has the necessary conditions for
immoral discrimination.41 As such, my criterion only applies to instances of
disparate treatment/disparate impact that have the potential to be immoral.
One final caveat about my criterion: it is only meant to cover instances of
discrimination that are concerned with social groups and their members.42 There
might be other forms of discrimination that are concerned only with particular
traits; there might be no good reason to restrict the concept of discrimination to
40 Disparate treatment and disparate impact in particular, that is. In other words, this neces-
sary condition is not meant to apply to things like structural discrimination and/or organiza-
tional discrimination. However, given how similar the latter two are to disparate treatment and/
or disparate impact, I think it’s likely that my criterion could apply to them (Altman, 2011). For
the sake of brevity, however, I will set that issue aside for now.
41 This, of course, depends on the account one adopts regarding discrimination’s wrongness.
42 For economy of expression, the phrase “social groups” should be interpreted as meaning
social groups as a whole or their individual members.
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just social groups.43 For instance, it might be impossible to argue that mistreat-
ing someone just because they wear glasses doesn’t constitute discrimination.
However, we can at least agree that there is a kind of discrimination that is just
about social groups, and it is this sort of discrimination I am concerned with.
With these provisos in mind, I propose thinking of discrimination in this way:
S1 discriminates against S2 when all of the following obtain: i) S1 (attempts to) treat S2
differently relative to S3; S2 is (supposedly) a member of socially significant Group N and
S3 is (supposedly) a member of socially significant Group M. ii) S1‘s (attempted) treatment
of S2 (would have) caused or maintained some kind of disparity between S2 and S3. iii) S1’s
(attempted) treatment of S2 can be causally explained by the fact that S2 (supposedly)
possesses some socially significant property P and is (supposedly) a member of Group N;
property P is associated with membership in Group N insofar as it is either (supposedly)
constitutive or derivative relative to membership in Group N; Property P is the contrast of
Property Q, which is associated with members of Group M. iv) S1’s differential treatment of
S2 relative to S3 is not sufficiently justified on the basis of Property P (or Group
Membership N).44
Before applying this criterion, I will explain its various components. The
verb “treats” is not meant to indicate that the agent is consciously trying to put
the other person at a disadvantage; the same may be said for “attempts”.
Similarly, the agent may either account for the victim’s group membership and
traits (consciously/unconsciously), or be solely concerned with their particular
non-group traits. However, in either case, the discriminator necessarily targets
socially significant traits that are associated with some socially significant
group, whether consciously or unconsciously. As for “disparity,” this term
covers a broad range of differential outcomes, both harmful and innocuous.
For instance, this allows my criterion to cover scenarios such as this: A hiring
manager only hires members of particular races for particular jobs and only
those jobs, although she pays all of them equally well.45 Intuitively, this seems
discriminatory but not harmful. Since “disparity” is being used broadly, my
criterion is able to include odd cases such as this one.
Under my criterion, both the affected groups and the targeted traits must be
socially significant. A socially significant property or social group has (or is
believed to have) relevance in several social dimensions; or it substantially
43 See Thomsen (2013).
44 Lippert-Rasmussen (2006, 168).
45 For a precedent of cases like this (albeit a negative one), see David Roediger’s and Elizabeth
Esch’s discussion of the division of labor between Irishmen and black people prior to Irishmen
being classified as whites (2012, 30–39). The idea is that they were assigned to particular jobs on
the basis of their race, although they were both treated fairly poorly. It’s not implausible to
suppose that the opposite might happen.
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influences the comportment (e.g. appearance, mannerisms) or capacities of
those who possess it. An example of a socially significant property with rele-
vance in several social dimensions would be one’s writing capabilities: Being
unable to write in clear English disqualifies people from certain work in the U.S.
and attaches a stigma of unintelligence to them. An example of a socially
significant group with multi-dimensional significance would be something like
ex-convicts or prior sexual offenders. Having that status has a wide array of
effects on their social lives, including general interpersonal relations, family
ties, employment opportunities, etc. An example of a trait that substantially
influences the agent’s comportment would be one’s religious beliefs. For
instance, someone who believes that the Christian Bible is authoritative on
ethics will try to live her life in a particular way. An example of a social group
that bears on the comportment of the individual would be something like one’s
cultural origin: people from different societies typically act and think differently
from one another to some degree.
The third clause of my criterion captures the most significant similarities
that exist between disparate treatment and disparate impact. As previously
explained, the correlative relationship between socially significant traits and
group membership is one of (supposed) constitution or derivation. That is, S2
possesses a trait that either helps constitute her being in Group N, or is deriva-
tive relative to her being a member of Group N. Alternatively, the discriminator
or the person responsible for the policy believes, explicitly or implicitly, that
such a relationship obtains. Insofar as the individual’s group membership is
constituted by having certain traits and is relevant to the attainment of further
derivative traits, we can say that disparate treatment and disparate impact are
alike since they focus on those sorts of traits.
The third clause also captures the deliberative similarities that exist between
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Namely, the fact that either discrimi-
nator treats S2 differently on the basis of a socially significant trait that is
consistently associated with her group membership. The deliberative involve-
ment of the victim’s group membership and particular traits can come in degrees.
For instance, an employer who fires an employee because her clientele is
prejudiced against the employee’s social group does not give a great deal of
weight to the victim’s group membership and relevant traits. However, she must
take stock of the strength of her clientele’s prejudice, and it seems unreasonable
to say that she would be unaware of the reasons for their biases and subse-
quently take them into account. Hence, even if there may be differences in degree
when it comes to the deliberative weight of the victim’s traits and group member-
ship, we can say that the discriminator employs some criterion specifying a trait
that is (supposedly) consistently associated with the victim’s group membership.
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The fourth element of my criterion requires that the policy must be insuffi-
ciently justified. As a prima facie, non-exhaustive characterization, insufficient
justification obtains when S1’s reasoning for excluding S2 on the basis of property
P (and her group membership) is actually irrelevant to any given legitimate goal.46
Regarding legitimacy, we can say that legitimate goals advocate morally permis-
sible ends (this is not an exhaustive characterization). Additionally, although
relevance might vary from case to case, there are at least some cases where a
criterion is irrelevant because it is not possible to produce a logically sound
argument that can establish its relevance to achieving a legitimate goal. For
another sense in which irrelevance might obtain, consider the following example.
In America, medical schools typically deny admittance to students who went to
community college prior to attending a four year university “even after GPA and
MCAT scores [are] taken into consideration”; the differences between the GPAs
and MCAT scores for four-year students and First-CC students was modest, with
the former group only slightly exceeding the latter.47 This policy of not admitting
First-CC students not only has a significant impact on economically disadvan-
taged students and racial minorities, but seems to lack proper justification. Thus,
in addition to what was already said about irrelevance, it seems we can say that a
poorly justified criterion either fails to take full account of all the facts related to
achieving the legitimate goals of the individual or organization making the
decision, or they overestimate the relevance of certain traits.
Having set up disparate treatment and disparate impact as being structu-
rally similar, one might wonder if such an understanding is incompatible with
our intuitions about certain real-world cases. The following section demon-
strates that understanding disparate treatment and disparate impact as funda-
mentally similar is compatible with our basic intuitions about certain real world
cases. Showing that my criterion has this compatibility would not definitively
demonstrate that disparate treatment and disparate impact are actually structu-
rally similar. Rather, by demonstrating that my criterion captures our basic
intuitions about discrimination, I eliminate the possibility that the conclusion
of Section III and Section IV (viz. disparate treatment and disparate impact are
structurally similar) can be falsified by discrediting my criterion. Doing so allows
us to say that it is at least plausible to understand disparate treatment and
disparate impact as being structurally similar to one another.
46 This is how insufficient justification is commonly characterized in the legal literature sur-
rounding discrimination (Altman 6). There are probably other ways of characterizing the issue,
but providing a full characterization of insufficient justification is beyond the scope of this paper.
47 Kellerman and Saguil (2014, 1591). I am indebted to my life partner, Romina Shahsavani, for
finding this example and suggesting that I use it in my paper.
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6 Applying the criterion48
Let’s start with the two court cases mentioned earlier, since it has yet to be
shown that they meet all the requirements of my criterion. In Dred Scott’s case,
he was being treated differently relative to whites. Additionally, the court’s
decision left him disadvantaged relative to whites: he walked away from the
courts without citizenship and its attached privileges. Additionally, he was
treated differently due to supposedly lacking the proper amount of moral
worth, which was either believed to be constitutive of or derivable from being
black.49 Finally, even assuming that having the proper amount of moral worth is
a relevant consideration for being a citizen, there is no reason to suppose that it
can be soundly demonstrated that black people possess a morally inferior
nature. Hence, the judges’ decision was poorly justified. Thus, Dred Scott’s
case meets my criterion for disparate treatment provided at the beginning of
the previous section, and also lines up with our intuitions about this case –
namely, that it’s an instance if disparate treatment.
As for disparate impact, recall Nuala Crilly’s case. In hindsight, according to
the court’s findings regarding the likelihood of women to take time off work for
family, Nuala Crilly was indeed treated differently by the partnership’s criterion
relative to men. Furthermore, it is certainly the case that Nuala Crilly’s rejection
was disadvantageous for her (i.e. her unemployment was perpetuated). It’s also
clear that her differential treatment at the hands of the partnership can be
explained by the fact that she lacked a certain amount of experience, and her
having this property was derived from the fact that she belongs to particular
social groups (viz. woman and parent).50 However, the employers only cited her
work experience, and were not directly concerned with her group membership.
Finally, as the court pointed out, the partnership’s specific criterion for work
experience was actually poorly justified relative to their aims as a company.
Hence, Nuala Crilly’s case meets my criterion for disparate impact, and our basic
intuitions about the scenario – namely, that it’s an instance of disparate impact.
Now I’ll demonstrate that my criterion captures our intuitions about what
doesn’t count as discriminatory. Suppose that a hiring manager is looking for
applicants with degrees in engineering for a highly technical job. One man and
48 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the third, fourth, and fifth examples
in this section.
49 Given the details of the justices’ reasoning, I take this to be fairly obvious. Whether the
relevant trait was thought to be constitutive or derivative isn’t too important for our purposes,
but it should be clear that the justices thought of it as being an instance of one of those two.
50 See Section IV.
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one woman apply for the job, but only the man has the relevant degree. Suppose
further that due to certain social conditions surrounding gender socialization,
men are more likely to have engineering degrees than women. Since the man
had the degree, he was hired, but the woman was turned down. Obviously the
female applicant was treated differently and is disadvantaged relative to the
male applicant, and this differential treatment can be explained by the fact that
she had a certain property/lacked a certain property. Furthermore, her having a
certain property/lacking a certain property obtained in virtue of social condi-
tions surrounding her group membership. However, this case cannot constitute
an instance of disparate impact under my criterion: It seems like having an
engineering degree is relevant to the job at hand, and thus fails to meet the
fourth element of my criterion. This conclusion also lines up with our intuitions
about this case, viz. that it’s not discriminatory.
Let’s take another example, this time regarding disparate treatment.
Suppose two people apply for a pastoral position at a church, one of them an
Atheist and the other one a Christian. The job description for the pastoral
position requires the individual to be a practicing Christian, so the Atheist is
obviously rejected for the position. It’s fairly obvious that she was rejected in
virtue of her group membership, a necessary component of which is having the
property of not believing in God or not believing in the Bible. Either of those
properties could have been cited as a reason for rejecting the Atheist candidate if
the people in charge of the church were pressed for further explanation.
Furthermore, this kind of policy certainly has a disparate effect between
Christians and Atheists. However, it seems like the criterion employed by the
church is fairly relevant to their goals. Here’s one reason why the criterion might
be considered relevant: As far as fundamentalist churches are concerned, the
“no Atheists allowed” rule is relevant insofar as one of the roles of a pastor is to
provide counseling to individuals who face subjective spiritual crises. Insofar as
believing in God is a necessary part of helping people deal with such problems
in the context of a fundamentalist church, being a Christian and not an Atheist
is a relevant hiring criterion. In other words, since this scenario fails to meet the
fourth element of my criterion, it therefore fails to count as an instance of
disparate treatment. This conclusion also lines up with our pre-conceived intui-
tions about the case, viz. it’s not a case of disparate treatment.
Before concluding this section, let’s consider two scenarios that would
initially appear to counter my criterion. Let’s say that a small business owner
is considering some applicants, and she has a deep, irrational hatred for
Germans. Subsequently, she refuses to hire anyone of German descent and
fires anyone who is later exposed as being German. Suppose that someone of
German descent applies to her business, and she knows that this person is
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German. On that basis alone she rejects the applicant. This seems to be a
counter-example to my criterion: the business owner rejected the applicant
purely based on her group membership, and not on the basis of some trait
correlated with her group membership. Even though this scenario apparently
does not meet my criterion, it’s obviously a case of discrimination.
I do not believe a case precisely like this could obtain in the actual world,
and as such cannot constitute a legitimate counter-example to my criterion.
I’ll explain the former assertion momentarily but justify the latter claim pre-
sently. If nothing precisely like this case could happen in our world, it is a
counter-example on the assumption that we ought to give greater weight to
conceptual possibility than to actual possibility when theorizing discrimination,
at least when the two conflict. However, it seems like what is actually possible
should be the first thing to determine how discrimination is conceptualized.
Discrimination is an empirical event, and therefore must be conceptualized
according to what actually happens, first and foremost. What actually happens
depends on what can actually happen or “how the world really works”, so to
speak. Hence, discrimination must be conceptualized according to what is
actually possible before turning to what is logically possible. Therefore, when
we seek to understand discrimination via examples, the kinds of examples that
have priority must be based on what is actually possible. In other words, if we
have a situation where logical possibility and actual possibility conflict, we
ought to give priority to actual possibility. Thus, if the above scenario is not
actually possible, we have good reason to think it does not undermine my
criterion for discrimination.
The question now is whether or not the above case is actually possible. If we
mean to say that the business owner hates Germans for no reason whatsoever,
this is implausible. It’s a truism that one’s prejudices develop over time through
socialization, exposure to stereotypes, personal experiences, etc. Furthermore,
the reasons for prejudice are usually trait or stereotype oriented, with cognition
playing some role in bringing about or justifying the relevant biases.51 In other
words, prejudice is fueled by one’s perceptions or cognitive interpretations
of the traits that certain groups (supposedly) possess. All of this is to say that
I don’t think it’s plausible to suppose that our imaginary business owner hates
Germans without believing, consciously or unconsciously, that there are certain
traits they possess that warrant her ire.52 I am willing to grant that she is
51 See Kunda and Thagard (1996); Yamauchi (2005) Rutland, Killen, and Abrams (2010);
Crandall et al. (2011).
52 I am assuming that the relevant traits are at least perceived as significant in other social
dimensions.
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consciously motivated by her hatred for Germans qua group members, but
I don’t think the scenario, realistically constructed, stops there. Similar to
what happens in unconscious disparate treatment, we can say that the business
owner was unaware of the fact that she was motivated by particular traits, or at
least they were not at the forefront of her mind as she was acting.53
We can say that this crude case of discrimination actually fails to counter
my criterion for two reasons. First, given the way prejudices form in the actual
world, nothing precisely like it could happen in our world. Second, were it
presented realistically, it would actually meet every requirement of my criterion:
the business owner treats the applicant differently; the business owner disad-
vantages the applicant; the business owner treats the applicant differently
because of some trait associated with her group, and she cares about the trait
at least unconsciously; her selection of the trait and the applicant’s group
membership cannot be adequately justified. Hence, this cannot serve as a
legitimate counter-example to my criterion.
The second scenario is supposedly a case of disparate impact. Let’s say that
S2 works at a restaurant where all employees are required to wear a uniform. At
the time she was hired she self-identified as a Christian, but later she decided to
renounce her faith. However, she still wears a cross around her neck. Although
her wearing the cross at work does not interfere with her basic duties, the
restaurant has a policy stating that non-uniform accessories may not be worn
sans a legitimate religious reason. Since she refuses to follow the policy, her
manager had to let her go. Intuitively, this seems like a case of disparate impact:
one could say that she was discriminated against on the basis of a group-neutral
trait (i.e. Christians don’t have a “monopoly” on that symbol) that is still
consistently associated with a particular social group; she is also at a disadvan-
tage relative to her former co-workers, religious and non-religious; and since her
wearing the cross does not interfere with her basic duties, and given how
commonplace the cross qua symbol has become (e.g. fashion), it doesn’t seem
relevant to the goals of the restaurant. Intuitively, we seem to have a case of
disparate impact, but the problem is that it doesn’t meet the first element of my
criterion: S2 is no longer a member of the relevant social group. If this is a case
of disparate impact, it seems to counter my criterion.
53 Refuting this scenario also deals with the objection that there are some instances of
disparate treatment where the deliberative process does not include the victim’s traits, viz. an
objection to the conclusions of Section III. If prejudice, and by extension discrimination, is itself
based on cognition about traits or stereotypes, this at least makes the objection that there are
some cases of disparate treatment that don’t involve traits in the deliberative process less
plausible.
Discrimination Revised 23
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 8/26/15 4:47 AM
The simplest way to deal with this scenario is to reiterate that my criterion is
concerned strictly with group-oriented discrimination. That is, my criterion is
meant to address instances of discrimination that affect social groups and their
members. In this case, S2 is no longer a member of the relevant social group.
Therefore, my criterion doesn’t apply to this scenario in the first place. That’s not
to say this example doesn’t involve some sort of discriminatory behavior. She
was discriminated on the basis of some trait she possessed, so we can admit that
this is an instance of trait-oriented discrimination. Since this is actually a case of
trait-oriented discrimination, and my criterion only addresses group-oriented
discrimination, this does not constitute a legitimate counter-example to my
criterion.
7 Conclusion
The overarching goal of my paper has been to demonstrate that group-oriented
disparate treatment and disparate impact are structurally similar to one another,
and that this notion is compatible with our basic intuitions about discrimination.
Since both kinds of discrimination involve focusing on socially significant traits,
this reveals that they involve similar deliberative processes. Furthermore, given
the relationship between how being in a social group affects an individual and
the deliberative process of disparate impact and disparate treatment, they turn
out to be about group membership in fundamentally similar ways. Not only does
the criterion provided capture these similarities, but it conforms to our intuitions
about what does and does not count as discriminatory. Since my criterion
accurately captures which cases are discriminatory and which ones are not, it
seems like an acceptable way of understanding disparate treatment and dispa-
rate impact. As such, we may conclude that disparate treatment and disparate
impact are structurally similar to one another without sacrificing our basic
intuitions about discrimination.
One might wonder the following: If disparate treatment and disparate
impact are as similar as I have claimed, are we warranted in distinguishing
them as separate kinds of discrimination or are they fundamentally the same?
There is still at least one difference between them: a disparate treatment dis-
criminator still accounts for the victim’s group membership. Subsequently, there
are at least three possible conclusions regarding the distinction between dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact. If the former difference is substantial, as
is commonly believed, we’d still be merited in saying that disparate treatment
and disparate impact are distinct kinds of discrimination. Alternatively, the fact
that a disparate treatment discriminator accounts for the victim’s group
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membership might be insignificant in the grand scheme of things. If so, dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact might be practically identical given all
their other similarities. However, one could argue that since the two forms of
discrimination do not share all the same properties, it would be disingenuous to
claim that they are virtually identical to one another, regardless of how insig-
nificant their differences are. For my part, the second alternative has a certain
intuitive persuasiveness, although the third alternative seems to carry more
logical force. Regardless, these are implications best left to another paper.
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